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UNBUCKLING THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE IN
ARKANSAS
Spencer G. Dougherty*
INTRODUCTION
The “seat belt defense” has been hotly litigated over the
decades in numerous jurisdictions across the United States. It is
an affirmative defense that, when allowed, reduces a plaintiff’s
recovery for personal injuries resulting from an automobile
collision where the defendant can establish that those injuries
would have been less severe or avoided entirely had the plaintiff
been wearing an available seat belt. This is an unsettled legal
issue in Arkansas, despite the growing number of cases in which
the seat belt defense is raised as an issue. Most jurisdictions,
including Arkansas, initially rejected the defense,1 but the basis
for those rejections has grown less compelling over the decades.
A growing number of states have recognized the defense in recent
years.2 In light of recent developments in tort law and the factual
reality of the proven efficacy of seat belts, it is time for the
Arkansas Supreme Court to revisit the issue and rule definitively
in favor of allowing evidence of seat belt non-use for damage
reduction.
*
J.D. Candidate, University of Arkansas School of Law. Note & Comment Editor,
Arkansas Law Review, 2019-2020. The author sincerely thanks Professor Jill Wieber Lens
for her thoughtful guidance as faculty advisor, the staff of the Arkansas Law Review for their
commitment to diligent editing, and his father, mother, and brother for their steadfast support
throughout the process of drafting this publication.
1. ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-37-703 (1995), invalidated by Mendoza v. WIS Int’l, Inc.,
2016 Ark. 157, 490 S.W.3d 298.
2. See generally Admissibility of Seat Belt Non-Use Evidence State by State Guide,
TRAFFIC RESOURCE CTR. FOR JUDGES, [https://perma.cc/D5CV-JA2P] (last visited Jan. 30,
2020); Gary L. Wickert, Seat Belt Defense in All 50 States, MATTHIESEN, WICKERT &
LEHRER, S.C. (Apr. 25, 2019), [https://perma.cc/8WV7-LQ5B] (“A.C.A. § 27-37-703,
which made evidence of failure to use a seat belt in a civil action[,] was found
unconstitutional by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Mendoza v. WIS International . . . . The
exact implications of this ruling are yet to be determined.”).
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To Arkansans, and Americans at large, automobiles offer
historically unprecedented mobility and convenience.3 For over
a century, the primacy of motor vehicles as the transportation of
choice for Americans has gone virtually unchallenged.4 The
American dependence on automobiles came to be in part because
of the relative accessibility and affordability of motor vehicles
and in part because the national infrastructure developed
concurrently with the motor vehicle boom of the twentieth
century.5 Americans drive, on average, nearly thirty-two miles
every day, and over 88% of Americans over the age of sixteen
“reported that they dr[i]ve at least occasionally.”6
The convenience afforded by car ownership belies a massive
and tragic human cost: An immense number of injurious and fatal
traffic accidents occur every year in the United States.7
Thousands of those injuries and deaths could be prevented every
year by merely wearing a seat belt; however, in a majority of
jurisdictions drivers who put themselves and others at risk by not
using available seat belts face little chance of having to pay for
their omissions in the courtroom.8 Most states maintain statutes
prohibiting defendants from presenting evidence of seat belt nonuse to reduce a plaintiff’s recovery.9 The justifications for these
statutes, while possibly defensible many years ago, no longer
reflect the public policy of Arkansas or the United States.10
Like many other states, Arkansas (for decades) maintained a
statute prohibiting admission of evidence of seat belt non-use for

3. See Edward Humes, The Absurd Primacy of the Automobile in American Life, THE
ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2016), [https://perma.cc/78JM-EH3D].
4. See id.
5. See Alex Taylor III, America’s Love Affair with Its Cars Is Far from Over, FORTUNE
(July 3, 2013), [https://perma.cc/DA8J-9VBR].
6. BRIAN TEFFT, AAA FOUND. FOR TRAFFIC SAFETY, AMERICAN DRIVING SURVEY:
2015-2016 (2018), [https://perma.cc/FBE2-KUH6].
7. Press Release, Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin. (NHTSA), USDOT Releases
2016 Fatal Traffic Crash Data (Oct. 6, 2017), [https://perma.cc/9QLS-QEDX].
8. See NHTSA, OCCUPANT PROTECTION IN PASSENGER VEHICLES 1, 6 (2018),
[https://perma.cc/AWS8-M9F2]; Wickert, supra note 2.
9. Steven B. Hantler et al., Moving Toward the Fully Informed Jury, 3 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 21, 32 (2005).
10. See Michelle R. Mangrum, The Seat Belt Defense: Must the Reasonable Man Wear
a Seat Belt?, 50 MO. L. REV. 968, 977-78 (1985).
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purposes of reducing damages.11 The Arkansas Supreme Court
overturned the statute in 2016, but its decision seemed motivated
more by a desire to check the procedural rule-making authority of
the Arkansas Legislature than to mold evidentiary standards to
comport with public policy.12 The Court overturned the statute as
a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, yet failed to rule
on whether evidence of seat belt non-use would be admissible in
civil actions moving forward.13 As a result, the state of the law in
Arkansas is unclear, much to the consternation of both plaintiffs’
and defense lawyers.14
The Arkansas Supreme Court’s newly-reclaimed power to
write its own procedural rules remains vulnerable to further
attempts by the legislature to wrest rule-making authority from
the judiciary through successor ballot initiatives.15 There is little
question, however, that the time has come for the Arkansas
Supreme Court and the other relevant judicial rule-making bodies
to allow admission of evidence of seat belt non-use for allocation
of comparative fault.16 Continued judicial fence-sitting on the
issue undermines both the state law requiring drivers to wear seat
belts and the hard-won public recognition of their efficacy. This
Comment analyzes the history of the seat belt defense in the
United States, with particular emphasis on Arkansas and
neighboring jurisdictions. The Comment will then examine the
current state of the law in Arkansas and advocate for allowing
admission of evidence of seat belt non-use in Arkansas.

11. ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-37-703 (1995), invalidated by Mendoza v. WIS Int’l, Inc.,
2016 Ark. 157, 490 S.W.3d 298.
12. See Justice J. Brooks, Mendoza v. WIS International, Inc.: The Supreme Court’s
Decision Makes Seat Belt Non-Use Relevant Evidence, 52-WTR ARK. LAW. 34, 34 (2017).
13. See Mendoza v. WIS Int’l, Inc., 2016 Ark. 157, 9-10, 490 S.W.3d 298, 303-04.
14. See Brooks, supra note 12, at 34-35.
15. Although Issue 1 was struck from the ballot, it is safe to assume that similar
proposals will follow in the future. See Joshua M. Silverstein & Jerry Cox, Good Riddance
to Issue 1, NW. ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (Oct. 21, 2018), [https://perma.cc/TDB6NMN8].
16. The Policy Basis for Seat Belt Evidence Gag Statutes No Longer Exists, TAYLOR |
ANDERSON, LLP (Nov. 7, 2016), [https://perma.cc/CJN2-U5NJ].
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I. BACKGROUND
When a careless driver rear-ends another vehicle and causes
injuries to its passengers, the question of liability would normally
be straightforward. The offending driver, or his or her insurance,
would assume total liability for the injuries and compensate the
aggrieved party.17 However, if that injured party were somehow
at fault in the accident in some way, they would be expected to
have their damages reduced according to their percentage of
fault.18 This notion of comparative fault is not novel or
controversial. If, for example, the plaintiff was not wearing his
or her seat belt and suffered much worse injuries as a result, the
logical conclusion would be that the plaintiff contributed to the
proximate cause of their injuries and would therefore be subject
to a reduction in damages based on their percentage of fault. This
is the rationale behind the seat belt defense. It is a relatively
simple theory which provides that in an accident where the
injured person was not wearing a seat belt, the responsible party
may use the defense to reduce their liability by the amount of
damages that would have been avoided if the person had been
wearing their seat belt. Even though the rationale seems simple
enough, for one reason or another, a shrinking majority of states
prohibit defendants from employing the defense by statute.
A. Motivations for Enacting Exclusionary Provisions
In the 1980s the federal government began to aggressively
promote seat belt initiatives which eventually led to most states
adopting mandatory seat belt use statutes. The National Highway
Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued a
regulation in 1984 requiring all passenger vehicles beginning with
the 1990 model year to include passive restraints such as seat belts
and air bags unless states constituting over two-thirds of the

17. See Charles R. Gueli, All About Rear-End Accident Claims and Injury
Compensation, INJ. CLAIM COACH, [https://perma.cc/9CLC-44UQ] (last visited Feb. 3,
2020).
18. See Car Accident Liability: Proving Fault in a Car Crash, FINDLAW,
[https://perma.cc/VQ9T-AEPS] (last visited Jan. 23, 2020).
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nation’s population adopted mandatory seat belt statutes.19 By
1987, a majority of states, including Texas, responded by passing
mandatory seat belt use statutes.20 Arkansas followed suit in
1991.21 Many of these statutes (including those passed by
Arkansas and Texas) included provisions barring the admission
of failure to wear a seat belt as evidence in civil actions.22
At the time, there were legitimate policy justifications for
including the exclusionary provisions. When the NHTSA
regulation went into effect, less than 13% of motor vehicle
occupants nationwide regularly used seat belts.23
Car
manufacturers had only recently been required to install seat belts
as standard equipment on all passenger vehicles, and much of the
public remained skeptical of seat belts’ effectiveness in
preventing injuries.24
The exclusionary provisions were also in large part enacted
at a time in which many states maintained harsh comparative fault
schemes capable of completely barring an otherwise-innocent
plaintiff’s recoverable damages for failure to wear a seat belt.25
Courts and legislatures were understandably “hesitant to allow a
jury to deprive a plaintiff who was not wearing a seatbelt of all
recovery against the person who negligently caused the
accident.”26 Although a majority of states now operate under
gentler, modified comparative fault schemes, many of the
exclusionary provisions have yet to be updated or discarded.27

19. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard; Occupant Crash Protection, 49 Fed. Reg.
28,962-01, 28,962 (July 17, 1984) (codified as amended at 49 C.F.R. § 571.208).
20. Nabors Well Servs., Ltd. v. Romero, 456 S.W.3d 553, 558 (Tex. 2015); TEX.
TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 545.412(d), 545.413(g) (West 2015) (relevant subsections repealed
2003).
21. ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-37-703 (1995), invalidated by Mendoza v. WIS Int’l, Inc.,
2016 Ark. 157, 490 S.W.3d 298.
22. Admissibility of Seat Belt Non-Use Evidence State by State Guide, supra note 2;
Wickert, supra note 2
23. Peter Scaff, The Final Piece of the Seat Belt Evidence Puzzle, 36 HOUS. L. REV.
1371, 1377 n.33 (1999).
24. See id. at 1377-78.
25. See Hantler et al., supra note 9, at 35.
26. See id.
27. See Wickert, supra note 2.
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The most commonly cited rationale for barring admissibility
is the purported “absence of a duty to wear a seat belt.”28 Courts
in these jurisdictions reason that, where there is no duty, a jury
should not be able to reduce a plaintiff’s damages for failure to
wear an available seat belt.29 Increasingly, however, evolving
public policy in many jurisdictions is eroding the rationales
against allowing admission of evidence of seat belt non-use.
B. The Unsettled State of the Law in Arkansas
Arkansas’s history with the seat belt defense closely mirrors
that of many other states that grappled with the issue. Originally,
under the common law of Arkansas, a passenger’s failure to “use
a seat belt constituted ‘fault’ under the comparative fault statute
and [was] admissible in[to] evidence,” so long as that “failure was
a proximate cause of [the plaintiff’s] injuries.”30 However, in
1991 the Arkansas legislature passed a statute mandating seat belt
use that also contained an exclusionary provision.31 For over two
decades, section 27-37-703 of the Arkansas Code (a “gag”
statute) barred defendants from introducing evidence of a
plaintiff’s non-use of a seat belt in lawsuits arising from motor
vehicle collisions.32 Arkansas’s gag statute barred evidence of a
plaintiff’s potentially negligent failure to use a seat belt from
reaching the jury, even when wearing a seat belt would have fully
prevented or lessened the plaintiff’s injuries.33 Arkansas courts
dutifully upheld the statute between 1991 and 2015 on the basis
of the unfair prejudice associated with allowing evidence of seat
belt non-use into the courtroom.34 However, as early as 1999
28. Mangrum, supra note 10, at 977-78 (citing Petersen v. Klos, 426 F.2d 199 (5th Cir.
1970); Taplin v. Clark, 626 P.2d 1198, 1201 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981); D.W. Boutwell Butane
Co. v. Smith, 244 So.2d 11, 13 (Miss. 1971); Amend v. Bell, 570 P.2d 138, 143 (Wash.
1988) (en banc)).
29. See id. at 978.
30. HOWARD W. BRILL & CHRISTIAN H. BRILL, LAW OF DAMAGES § 27:2 (6th ed.
2014).
31. ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-37-703 (1995), invalidated by Mendoza v. WIS Int’l, Inc.,
2016 Ark. 157, 490 S.W.3d 298 (“The failure of an occupant to wear a properly adjusted and
fastened seat belt shall not be admissible into evidence in a civil action.”).
32. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-37-703.
33. Brooks, supra note 12, at 34.
34. Allen v. Greenland, 347 Ark. 465, 475, 65 S.W.3d 424, 432 (2002).
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some Arkansas Supreme Court justices began to question the
statute’s validity.35
In 2016, the Arkansas Supreme Court substantially muddied
the waters in Mendoza v. WIS Int’l, Inc.36 In that case, a motor
vehicle passenger brought suit against a driver and his employer
for personal injuries suffered in a collision.37 The plaintiff was
not wearing a seat belt.38 The driver and his employer sought to
introduce evidence to that effect and challenge the
constitutionality of section 27-37-703.39 Unsure of how to
proceed, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Arkansas submitted a certified question to the Arkansas
Supreme Court: “[D]oes section 27-37-703, which restricts the
admissibility of seat belt non-use evidence in civil actions, violate
the separation-of-powers doctrine found in article IV, section 2,
of the Arkansas Constitution?”40
The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative and ruled
the gag statute unconstitutional, but for reasons which were
fundamentally different from the public policy considerations
relied upon by other states such as Texas.41 The Arkansas
Supreme Court recognized the legislature’s power to make
substantive law through statute but unequivocally asserted its
authority to determine the rules of evidence.42 In the Court’s
view, the statute represented an unconstitutional usurpation of
judicial rule-making authority by the state legislature because it
entirely restricted a certain kind of evidence from entering the
courtroom.43 Justice Danielson, who authored the opinion,
notably wrote “If we were to grant authority to the legislature to
determine the relevancy of evidence in court proceedings, we
35. Grummer v. Cummings, 336 Ark. 447, 451, 986 S.W.2d 91, 93 (1999) (Imber, J.,
concurring).
36. See Mendoza v. WIS Int’l, Inc., 2016 Ark. 157, 490 S.W.3d 298.
37. Id. at 2, 490 S.W.3d at 300.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1, 490 S.W.3d 298, 299.
41. Compare Nabors Well Serv., LTD. v. Romero, 456 S.W.3d 553, 564 (Tex. 2015),
with Mendoza, 2016 Ark. at 9-10, 490 S.W.3d at 303-04.
42. Mendoza, at 9-10, 490 S.W.3d at 303-04 (quoting State v. Sypult, 304 Ark. 5, 7,
800 S.W.2d 402, 404 (1990) (“[W]hen conflicts arise between legislation and rules of
evidence and procedure, ‘[the court’s] rules remain supreme.’”)).
43. Id. at 9-10, 490 S.W.3d at 303-04.
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would be depriving the trial courts of their exclusive authority to
determine the relevancy of evidence[, thereby creating] an absurd
result.”44 The Court therefore held that, as an evidentiary rule of
procedure, section 27-37-703 violated the separation-of-powers
doctrine and overruled the statute.
The split Mendoza decision, wherein three justices
dissented, highlighted a long-simmering and continuouslydeveloping power struggle between the two branches of the
Arkansas government concerning rule-making related to the
pleading, practice, and procedure of Arkansas courts.45 Two of
the dissenting justices reasoned the facts of the case were not even
applicable to the “Failure to Comply” statute and that the Court
needed not address the events of the Mendoza case outside of the
scope of the certified question.46 Justices Hart and Wood opined
in their dissents that Arkansas Rule of Evidence 402 gave the state
legislature the authority to statutorily determine evidentiary
relevance in court cases.47 By that logic, because the legislature
had determined that seat belt non-use was irrelevant in its statute,
the dissenting justices would have held the gag provision as
constitutional.48 Although the majority was not convinced by that
argument, the question still gave the Court pause enough to direct
the Civil Practice Committee to review Rule 402 to determine
whether the rule as currently written indeed does endow the
legislature with evidentiary rule-making authority.49 If so,
observers can expect significant changes to Rule 402 to place

44. Id. at 9, 490 S.W.3d at 303.
45. See id. at 10, 490 S.W.3d at 304.
46. Id. at 10-11, 490 S.W.3d at 304 (Baker, K., dissenting); id. at 11-19, 490 S.W.3d
at 304-09 (Hart, J., dissenting).
47. ARK. R. EVID. 402. (“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by statute.”).
48. See Mendoza, 2016 Ark. at 11-19, 490 S.W.3d at 308-09 (Hart, J., dissenting); id.
at 19, 490 S.W.3d at 308-09 (Wood, J., dissenting); see also Brooks, supra note 13, at 35.
49. See Mendoza, 2016 Ark. at 6, 9, 490 S.W.3d at 302, 303 n.1 (“We request our Civil
Practice Committee to review Rule 402 in light of this opinion. To the extent that any other
rules of evidence conflict with Johnson v. Rockwell, we refer those rules to the Committee
for review as well.”) (citing Johnson v. Rockwell, 2009 Ark. 241, 308 S.W.3d 135
(overturning a statute as violating the separation-of-powers doctrine when it “limited the
evidence that may be introduced relating to the value of medical expenses, thereby dictating
what evidence is admissible.”)).
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even more evidentiary rule-making power within the realm of the
judiciary.
The Arkansas defense bar, which long fought to assert
plaintiffs’ comparative fault for failure to wear available seat
belts, understandably believed they had achieved a significant
victory. Defense attorneys in the state pointed to the greater
severity of injury associated with failure to wear a seat belt as
justification for their position.50 The practical effects of making
evidence of non-use admissible are obvious—reductions in
plaintiffs’ damages based on juries’ newfound proclivities for
assigning fault for failure to wear seat belts when it becomes
evident that the plaintiff’s injuries would have been less severe
had the plaintiff been wearing a seat belt.
Although the initial reaction might have been to conclude
that evidence of seat belt non-use now constitutes relevant and
admissible evidence, that question remains very much up in the
air. Although Mendoza was conclusive on the separation-ofpowers issue, the Arkansas Supreme Court failed to specifically
answer one crucial question: whether, after the rejection of
section 27-37-703, evidence of non-use of a seat belt is now
relevant and admissible for purposes of a jury’s comparative fault
analysis.51 In the wake of Mendoza, Arkansas law regarding
admissibility is now unsettled at best and headache-inducing at
worst.52 It is an issue drenched in confusion. Litigators on both
sides of the issue struggle to discern and then articulate the law
relating to the admissibility of evidence of seat belt non-use.53
The issue requires resolution, irrespective of whether that
resolution comes from the judiciary.
The Arkansas Supreme Court has, in recent years, taken a
strong stance against the legislature commandeering judicial rulemaking authority.54 This power struggle between the two
branches has taken place in various arenas, with the most notable
50. See Brooks, supra note 12, at 35.
51. The Court’s opinion focused on the separation-of-powers issue and failed to make
any explicit determination as to whether evidence of seat belt non-use would be admissible
moving forward. See id. at 34-35.
52. See id. at 35.
53. See id.
54. Max Brantley, Judge Pierce Says Issue One Is Unconstitutional and Should Be
Removed from the Ballot, ARK. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2018), [https://perma.cc/2SLB-36E3].
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example constituting the Issue 1 “Tort Reform” measure, which,
had it not been struck from the ballot, would have given complete
judicial rule-making authority to the legislature.55 If the Arkansas
electorate had voted in favor of Issue 1, it is likely that the
legislature would have passed merely another gag statute barring
admission of evidence of seat belt non-use.56 However, the Court
remains the entity in charge of its rule-making authority and, at
some point, will have to address the viability of the seat belt
defense definitively.
II. ANALYSIS
In the wake of the Mendoza case, the Arkansas Supreme
Court has established its rule-making authority for evidentiary
matters and is now the entity responsible for determining whether
evidence of seat belt non-use is admissible as evidence of a
plaintiff’s comparative fault. The most equitable course the Court
can take when next presented with the issue is to rule that such
evidence is admissible—doing so would be fairer to both sides if
a plaintiff did indeed act negligently by not wearing a seat belt.
One thing is clear—the confusion stemming from the law as it
stands now benefits none and will not go away until the Court
definitively rules one way or another.
A. Arkansas’s Comparative Fault Scheme Allows for Fair
Apportionment of Damages Without Fully Barring NonNegligent Plaintiffs from Recovery
Arkansas courts rendered the decisions barring seat belt use
as evidence of a plaintiff’s negligence at a time that an all-ornothing rule applied.
However, given that the modern
comparative fault scheme has largely alleviated this concern, the
law barring seat belt use as evidence of a plaintiff’s negligence
should not be applied by courts in a state like Arkansas that no
longer abides by an all-or-nothing contributory negligence

55. Id.
56. See Roby Brock, Will Tort Reform Return?, TALK BUS. & POLITICS (Feb. 3, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/ZXA8-VT87].
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scheme.57 Arkansas’s comparative fault infrastructure is wellestablished and well-suited to accommodate the seat belt defense
as a method of reducing damages for failure to comply with the
seat belt statute and the standard of ordinary care, just as jurors
reduce damages for violation of any other legal duty. While
evidence of seat belt non-use, if allowed, would reduce a
plaintiff’s damages, the average person overwhelmingly
understands the safety benefits of seat belt use and an average
individual would likely consider non-use to be quite risky.58 Precomparative fault objections are no longer on point both because
there appears to be a duty to wear available seat belts and because
plaintiffs should not fear to suffer a complete loss of damages so
long as they are not more at fault than defendants.59 A plaintiff
suffering damages is still entitled to recovery so long as his or her
responsibility is not higher than that of the defendant’s.60
B. Seat Belt Use Is an Exercise of Ordinary Care
Just as most tort duties originate from statutes, Arkansas’s
mandatory seat belt use law strongly suggests the existence of a
duty of ordinary care to wear available seat belts, and failure to
comply with this duty now represents a breach of the general duty
to exercise reasonable care for one’s safety. The public policy
rationales underlying states adopting gag statutes now seem
archaic and unpersuasive considering the increasing public favor
towards seat belt use and jurisdictional acceptance of seat belt use
as an exercise of ordinary care. Arkansas’s seat belt statute
mandates that drivers and front seat passengers of motor vehicles
wear seat belts.61 Failure to comply with this statute, while not
57. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122 (1991).
58. See generally NHTSA, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PUB. NO. DOT-HS-812-456,
TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: SEAT BELT USE IN 2017—OVERALL RESULTS (Apr.
2018), [https://perma.cc/YJ4W-SF7U].
59. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
60. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122(b)(1) (1991) (“If the fault chargeable to a party
claiming damages is of a lesser degree than the fault chargeable to the party or parties from
whom the claiming party seeks to recover damages, then the claiming party is entitled to
recover the amount of his or her damages after they have been diminished in proportion to
the degree of his or her own fault.”).
61. The statutory duty to wear a seat belt comes from ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-37-702
(2003). Would not a violation of this statute constitute negligence per se, or at least strong
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necessarily negligence per se, should be considered by a jury as
evidence of fault. Even the Arkansas Model Jury Instructions
reference failure to wear a seat belt (a violation of state law) as
evidence of negligence.62 It’s past time for the Arkansas Supreme
Court to definitively rule in favor of allowing evidence of seat
belt non-use into the courtroom.
Seat belt non-use fits squarely into the definition of
unreasonable conduct. Arkansas law defines “fault” as “any act,
omission, conduct, the risk assumed, breach of warranty, or
breach of any legal duty which is a proximate cause of any
damages sustained by any party.”63 A breach of the duty of
ordinary care is considered proximate cause under the
comparative fault structure, and a growing number of
jurisdictions recognize a common law duty of ordinary care to
wear seat belts.64 Even Arkansas’s common law seems to suggest
the existence of a duty to wear available seat belts.
Before the State’s legislature implemented the now-defunct
gag statute, Arkansas courts generally expressed a willingness to
allow juries to assess fault to plaintiffs for failure to wear a seat
belt if defendants were able to prove that the omission constituted
a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.65 The most
illustrative case in support of this proposition was Potts v.
Benjamin, in which the Eighth Circuit predicted that Arkansas
juries could assess a percentage of fault against a plaintiff if the
defendant could demonstrate the degree to which using a seat belt
would have reduced the plaintiff’s injuries.66 The Eighth Circuit

evidence of negligence, to assess corresponding damage reductions? See Ark. Model Jury
Instr., Civil AMI 601.
62. See Ark. Model Jury Instr., Civil AMI 601.
63. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122.
64. See Baker v. Morrison, 309 Ark. 457, 462, 829 S.W.2d 421, 423 (1992)
(“appellants’ failure to wear their seatbelts was a failure to exercise ordinary care”); Bentzler
v. Braun, 149 N.W.2d 626, 640 (Wis. 1967) (“[A]s a matter of common knowledge, an
occupant of an automobile either knows or should know of the additional safety factor
produced by the use of seatbelts.”); Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153, 1160 (Wyo.
1992) (recognizing a parent’s common-law duty to buckle a minor passenger’s seatbelt in
light of statistics confirming the often dire results of failure to do so).
65. See Baker, 309 Ark. at 462, 829 S.W.2d at 423.
66. The Arkansas Supreme Court later validated the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning. See
Potts v. Benjamin, 882 F.2d 1320, 1323 (8th Cir. 1989) (predicting Arkansas law would
allow the admissibility of the plaintiff’s failure to wear seatbelt as evidence of comparative

2020

UNBUCKLING THE SEATBELT DEFENSE

147

further interpreted Arkansas law to hold that, even in the absence
of a statute requiring use, failure to wear an available seat belt
would constitute negligence under the general common-law
standard of ordinary care.67
A plaintiff’s failure to wear a seat belt would certainly
resemble proximate cause (under the usual understanding of the
term) if that failure to wear a seat belt, in a natural and continued
sequence, caused those injuries, and without that failure, the
injuries would not have occurred. The Arkansas Supreme Court
further held in Shelter Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tucker that a plaintiff’s
non-use of a seat belt could become an issue for the jury to the
extent that that non-use could be connected with the injuries she
sustained.68 Although the court in Mendoza did not rule on the
specific admissibility of seatbelt non-use, the Eighth Circuit
predicted in 1989 that failure to wear an available seatbelt would
constitute admissible evidence of comparative fault.69
C. Public Attitudes Toward Seat Belt Use Support Allowing
the Defense
The Texas Supreme Court’s recent pivot towards allowing
the seat belt defense reflects the shifting public attitude towards
allowing the seat belt defense, and its public policy considerations
should be quite persuasive for the Arkansas Supreme Court.
Texas’s longtime prohibition and recent allowance of the seat belt
defense represents a compelling historical corollary to the current
state of the law in Arkansas. For over “forty years[,] evidence of
a plaintiff’s failure to use a seat belt [was] inadmissible in caraccident cases” in Texas.70 The Texas Supreme Court first
implemented the rule “in 1974[] to offer[] plaintiffs safe harbor
from the harshness of an all-or-nothing comparative fault
scheme.”71 The Texas legislature statutorily prohibited evidence
fault); Baker, 309 Ark. at 461, 829 S.W.2d at 423 (“we think Benjamin correctly applied
Arkansas law”).
67. See Potts, 882 F.2d at 1322.
68. See Shelter Mutual Ins. Co. v. Trucker, 295 Ark. 260, 263-64, 748 S.W.2d 136,
137-38 (1988).
69. See Potts, 882 F.2d at 1323.
70. See Nabors Well Servs., Ltd. v. Romero, 456 S.W.3d 553, 555 (Tex. 2015).
71. Id.
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of seat belt non-use in all civil cases but then repealed that law in
2003, leaving the Supreme Court’s rule to stand alone.72
Although the rule may have been appropriate in its time, by 2015,
the Court recognized in Nabors Well Services, Ltd. v. Romero that
its prohibition on seat belt evidence had become an
“anachronism.”73 The Court rejected the rule as a vestige of an
old “legal system and an oddity in light of modern societal
norms.”74
The Romero Court centered its decision in part on statutory
interpretation based on the legislature’s overhaul of Texas’s
comparative fault scheme from an all-or-nothing bar into a
mechanism allowing juries to apportion negligence to plaintiffs
without entirely barring the plaintiff’s recovery.75 The state’s
updated comparative fault scheme now both allows and requires
jurors to consider pre-occurrence, injury-causing conduct such as
seat belt non-use.76 The second and strongest prong of the
Romero decision recognized the sound public policy rationale
behind allowing the seat belt defense.77 The Court recognized
that the law required seat belt use as an unquestioned part of daily
life for the vast majority of drivers and passengers.78 While the
Court did acknowledge the abundance of research establishing
that seat belts reduce injuries and save lives, it refused to belabor
the point with statistics.79 To do so, the Court held, would be to
acknowledge the existence of a long-ended debate over the
propriety of seat belt use.80 The Court refused to maintain “a
contradictory legal system [that] punished seat-belt nonuse with
criminal citations while allowing plaintiffs in civil lawsuits to
benefit from juries’ ignorance of their misconduct.”81
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. See Romero, 456 S.W.3d at 559 (“Gone is the harsh system of absolute victory or
total defeat.” (quoting Parker v. Highland Park Inc., 565 S.W. 2d 512, 518 (Tex. 1978))). In
Texas, a plaintiff is now entitled to a recovery reduced by his responsibility percentage, so
long as his responsibility does not exceed 50%. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 33.001 (1995).
76. Romero, 456 S.W.3d at 564.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 555.
79. Id. at 565.
80. Id.
81. Romero, 456 S.W.3d at 565.
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The American public in the twenty-first century mostly
understands and appreciates the life-saving capability of seat belts
and the risks associated with failure to use them. In 2016 alone,
motor vehicle crashes in the United States caused 37,461 fatalities
and over 2.7 million serious injuries.82 Over half of those killed
in passenger vehicles between the ages of 13 to 44 were not
wearing seat belts at the time of the crash.83 NHTSA estimates
that seat belt use would have prevented approximately half of
those fatalities and injuries.84 Although the numbers are bleak,
increased seat belt use has contributed to a general downward
trend in traffic fatalities over the past decade.85 Seat belts saved
nearly 15,000 lives in 2016.86
In light of the available statistics, it is no small wonder that
the public at large today acknowledges the importance of seat belt
use. Seat belt use nationwide has increased steadily since the turn
of the century.87 In 2017, an estimated 89.7% of all motor vehicle
occupants nationwide routinely used seat belts.88 This sentiment
is also nearly universally reflected in state law—forty-nine states
have statutes in place requiring seat belt use and sanctioning
motorists who fail to use them.89 Even the common law of many
jurisdictions, deliberative as it may be, now considers seat belt
use to be an exercise of reasonable care.90
82. See generally NHTSA, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PUB. NO. DOT-HS-812-456, 2016
FATAL MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES: OVERVIEW (2017), [https://perma.cc/7UZE-8CSG]
[2016 FATAL MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES]; CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OVERALL MV-OCCUPANT NONFATAL
EMERGENCY DEP’T VISITS AND RATES PER 100,000 (2016), [https://perma.cc/CJ8T-PLXN].
83. NHTSA, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PUB. NO. DOT-HS-812-494, TRAFFIC SAFETY
FACTS: 2016 DATA (2018), [https://perma.cc/75VF-MZ3N].
84. See id.
85. 2016 FATAL MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES, supra note 82.
86. See generally NHTSA, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PUB. NO. DOT-HS-812-454,
LIVES SAVED IN 2016 BY RESTRAINT USE AND MINIMUM-DRINKING-AGE LAWS (2017),
[https://perma.cc/TY5P-KYQJ].
87. 2016 FATAL MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES, supra note 82.
88. Id.
89. See generally INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY & HIGHWAY LOSS DATA INST.,
SEAT BELTS—LAWS (2019), [https://perma.cc/WMU2-L42S].
90. See, e.g., Baker v. Morrison, 309 Ark. 457, 462, 829 S.W.2d 421, 423 (1992)
(“appellants’ failure to wear their seat belts was a failure to exercise ordinary care”); Bentzler
v. Braun, 149 N.W.2d 626, 639-40 (Wis. 1967) (“[T]here is a duty, based on the common
law standard of ordinary care, to use available seat belts independent of any statutory
mandate . . . . [I]t is obvious that, on the average, persons using seat belts are less likely to
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The national consciousness of expecting motorists to use
available seat belts predictably permeates the courtroom. Just as
the first question people often ask in the immediate aftermath of
a car accident is whether the occupant was wearing a seat belt,
jurors deliberating civil cases concerning automobile accidents
undoubtedly harbor the same question.91 Although the question
of whether a claimant injured in a car crash failed to wear a seat
belt would seem germane to a jury’s assessment of damages,
many states (including, until recently, Arkansas) maintain statutes
that completely bar or severely restrict admission of evidence of
seat belt non-use.92 These gag statutes prohibit defense lawyers
in those jurisdictions from asserting the seat belt defense to reduce
a claimant’s damages for injuries that seat belt use by the claimant
would likely have mitigated or prevented.93 To understand why
these exclusionary provisions exist in such an apparent
contradiction of public policy, it is crucial to address the
underlying rationales that existed at the time of their enactment.
Decades ago, the public harbored skepticism towards the
effectiveness and safety of seat belt use.94 This skepticism in
large part led many states to enact gag statutes that still exist
today. Many states implemented these laws at a time where cars
were not all built with seat belts, and many states did not have
laws requiring seat belt use.95 Now, the public expectation
(enshrined by statute in most states) is that drivers will use
available seat belts when on the road. As noted by the Texas
Supreme Court, any debate over the effectiveness of seat belts has

sustain injury and, if injured, the injuries are likely to be less serious . . . . [A]s a matter of
common knowledge, an occupant of an automobile either knows or should know of the
additional safety factor produced by the use of seat belts.”).
91. Steven B. Hantler, Moving Toward the Fully Informed Jury, 3 GEO. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 21, 32 (2005).
92. See id.
93. See Potts v. Benjamin, 882 F.2d 1320, 1322-23 (8th Cir. 1989) (predicting that the
Arkansas Supreme Court would, in the absence of a statute requiring use, consider non-use
of a seat belt to constitute a proximate cause of a claimant’s injury if some or all of the
damages sustained would not have occurred had the seat belt been worn); Baker v. Morrison,
309 Ark. 457, 461, 829 S.W.2d 421, 423 (1992) (“Benjamin correctly applied Arkansas
law”); Brooks, supra note 12, at 34.
94. See Mangrum, supra note 10, at 978.
95. See Brian T. Bagley, The Seat Belt Defense in Texas, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 707, 71617 (2004).
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long ended.96 Those concerns are no longer on point, and the
Arkansas Supreme Court, when next confronted with the issue,
will have an opportunity to bring the state’s common law into
accordance with the well-developed public recognition of the lifesaving ability of seat belt use. Arkansas should join a growing
number of states that have recently dumped their anachronistic
gag statutes.97 It is past time for the state’s top court to lend
judicial recognition to the effectiveness of seat belts and
recognize that violation of the statutorily imposed duty to use
available seat belts itself constitutes negligence for damage
reduction.
It is essential to remember that every collision case in which
a trial judge allows the defendant to assert the seat belt defense
diminishes an otherwise innocent plaintiff’s ability to collect full
damages for their injuries.98 The result can be a harsh outcome in
which a negligent defendant arguably escapes full liability for
blaming an injured person for their injuries.99 Trial judges
presiding over these cases should be mindful that to allow the
defense does, to some extent, punish an otherwise innocent party.
However, if the plaintiff is unfairly prejudiced, the trial judge will
retain broad discretion to bar nonprobative evidence of seat belt
non-use. Even if the Arkansas Supreme Court does definitively
classify seat belt non-use as relevant evidence, plaintiffs’ lawyers
will still have a line of defense available that could exclude this
96. An increasing number of state supreme courts and federal courts recognize the
policy justifications for allowing the seat belt defense. See Nabors Well Servs., Ltd. v.
Romero, 456 S.W.3d 553, 565 (Tex. 2015); see, e.g., Carlson v. Ferris, 85 P.3d 504, 510
(Colo. 2003); Waterson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 544 A.2d 357, 373 (N.J. 1988).
97. Idaho (2014 Idaho Sess. Laws 793, 795 (repealed 2014)), Oklahoma (2013 Okla.
Sess. Laws 1, 3 (repealed 2013)), and Texas (1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1643, 1643-44
(repealed 2003)) are three states that have invalidated gag provisions through either statutory
action or judicial mandate.
98. 1 COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL § 4:4 (3d ed. 2019).
99. Id. (“In contributory negligence jurisdictions, one reason why the seat belt defense
has been disfavored is because of the harshness of the result of denying plaintiff any recovery
even though his or her failure to wear a seat belt did not cause the initial accident. This
objection has been obviated in pure comparative negligence systems, since the plaintiff’s
recovery may be reduced proportionately rather than totally barred. However, in modified
comparative negligence systems which utilize the “50-50” or “49-51” formulas, the objection
is still pertinent, since admitting evidence of nonuse of a seat belt as comparative negligence
could tip the balance against the plaintiff in the final allocation of the parties’ respective
negligence, resulting in a denial of recovery for [the] plaintiff.”).
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evidence any time it unfairly prejudices the plaintiff. Rule 403 of
the Arkansas Rules of Evidence dictates that a court may still
exclude any relevant evidence if its risk of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs its probative value.100 Arkansas case law
before the imposition of the gag provision frequently held in
certain cases that evidence of seat belt non-use might impose
unfair prejudice in negligence cases.101 If the Arkansas Supreme
Court does definitively rule that evidence of non-use is relevant,
as it should, courts will likely apply Rule 403 on a case-by-case
basis, as they do for any other piece of evidence. This fight over
prejudice will take place in the courtroom, where it belongs,
rather than being arbitrarily barred by statute before defendants
can even introduce the evidence.
D. Allowing Admission of Evidence of Seat Belt Non-Use Is
a Positive Step Towards Fully Informing Juries
Given the enormous stakes that often accompany jury
decisions, we expect juries to render decisions considering all
relevant facts in the case. The jury is the most critical mechanism
in the American judicial system for safeguarding individual
rights. Hiding evidence of seat belt non-use from juries in
Arkansas deprives the fact finder of crucial information, which
then prevents them from proportionally allocating damage
awards. Jurors cannot be expected to decide a case fairly when
relevant evidence, such as evidence of seat belt non-use, is hidden
from them by statute in apparent contrast to the principal of liberal
admission of evidence espoused by the judiciary. As previously
discussed, preventing evidence of seat belt non-use from reaching
the jury goes against the scientifically-accepted safety benefits
and public understanding associated with seat belts and
undermines the very state law that requires their use in motor
vehicles. Preventing a jury from assessing such an essential fact
100. Even if the seat belt defense is affirmatively allowed, plaintiffs are not
automatically disadvantaged. If a plaintiff’s failure to wear a seat belt had minimal bearing
on the damages suffered, and a jury would be likely to view the plaintiff negatively for that
failure in spite of the limited factual relevance, the court would exclude that evidence under
Rule 403. See ARK. R. EVID. 403.
101. See Gummer v. Cummings, 336 Ark. 447, 986 S.W.2d 91 (1999).
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in determining damages, even when the seat belt use is wholly
relevant to a case and might have prevented death or severe
injury, seems contradictory to notions of justice that the legal
system demands and taints any determination made without that
evidence.
The Arkansas judiciary must allow juries to consider
evidence of seat belt non-use when allocating fault. Courts
entrust jurors with the responsibility of making factual
determinations to make fully informed decisions and should not
then expect fair outcomes when they prevent access to crucial
evidence in adherence to a now-defunct doctrine. Courts must
recognize the jury’s ability to weigh the value of a piece of
evidence and determine whether that evidence might warrant a
reduction in damages. Any fight over whether a jury should be
able to consider evidence of seat belt non-use should not be
decided by statute before any legal proceedings take place—it
should be resolved in front of a judge.
CONCLUSION
Arkansans know that seat belts save lives and understand the
risks of not using them on the road. The public views the notion
of seat belt non-use much more unfavorably now than it did when
states, such as Arkansas, implemented gag provisions prohibiting
their introduction to establish comparative fault. In this
contemporary age, reasonable individuals know that by not
buckling up, they put themselves at risk of severe harm in the
event of a collision. A growing number of states are tossing aside
their exclusionary provisions in recognition of the current
comparative fault climate and overwhelming public opinion in
support of encouraging and mandating seat belt use. It is time for
the Arkansas judiciary to lead from the front and recognize the
statutory and common law duty to wear a seat belt and hold
individuals equally accountable in negligence actions for their
omissions.

